Escalating the war in Afghanistan would be the wrong decision

Editor’s Note: Michael Kugelman is deputy director and senior associate for South Asia with the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center. The views expressed here are his own.

In recent days, with Afghanistan’s Taliban insurgency continuing to gain steam and America’s longest war staggering through its 16th year, analysts have started invoking the v-word (and it’s not “victory”).

Vietnam is a sadly apt analogy. Indeed, just as they did in Vietnam 50 years ago, US troops in Afghanistan are fighting a costly, intractable, and unending conflict against a relentlessly resilient asymmetric foe.

However, it’s not a perfect analogy. The Vietnam War provoked impassioned debate back home, but Americans are hardly discussing the war in Afghanistan. It’s completely off the radar.

It’s high time we talk about this forgotten war, and especially with the Trump administration considering a new policy that would escalate US military involvement. Escalation would be a mistake, and it would further prolong a conflict that can’t be won.

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Published 8:58 PM EDT, Fri May 12, 2017

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Trump weighs sending troops to Afghanistan

00:54 - Source: CNN

Vietnam War: How they saw it from both sides of the divide

The proposed strategy, according to the Washington Post, would deploy more military force against the Taliban to pressure it to come to the negotiating table.

The problem with the White House plan is that we’ve tried it before, during the troop surge in 2010 and 2011, and it didn’t work – even with the withering firepower of 100,000 soldiers unleashed on the Taliban.

One may reasonably argue that the warfighting capacities of Afghan security forces have improved considerably in recent years, and that these better-trained servicemen, aided by US troops, will have more success tackling the Taliban this time around.

And yet, to assume that more robust military force alone will put the Taliban on the defensive is to badly underestimate the group’s strength and to underappreciate the many different sources of that strength.

The Taliban leadership has safe havens in neighboring Pakistan, and insurgencies never die so long as they enjoy cross-border sanctuaries. The Taliban has also received periodic military support from Tehran. With U.S.-Iran relations having taken a tumble since President Trump took office, such support could intensify. Moscow, according to the US military, is now funneling aid to the Taliban as well.

Additionally, the Afghan government is an unwitting source of strength for the Taliban. The weak and dysfunctional administration in Kabul is hampered by corruption and personal animosities and is hard-pressed to carry out even the most basic of tasks – much less craft a formal counterinsurgency policy.

Commander of the Resolute Support mission and U.S. Forces in Afghanistan Army Gen. John W. Nicholson speaks during a press conference, in Kabul, Afghanistan, Friday, April 14, 2017.

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Meanwhile, the arrival of ISIS in Afghanistan has enabled the Taliban to project itself as a softer, more palatable alternative to the savagery of ISIS. All of this increases the Taliban’s appeal and helps boost recruitment. The Taliban, like all effective insurgent groups, knows how to win hearts and minds.

The takeaway is that the war in Afghanistan can’t be won. But it need not be lost either, so long as the option remains of pursuing a negotiated end to the war. Admittedly, this makes for the tallest of orders; the Taliban’s battlefield successes give it little incentive to stop fighting.

The Taliban, a Sunni Islamist organization operating primarily in Afghanistan and Pakistan, was formed in 1994. It was led by Mullah Mohammed Omar, a veteran of the Afghan mujahedeen that fought invading Soviets from 1979-1989. Omar, seen here in an undated video image, died in April 2013, according to a representative for Afghan President Ashraf Ghani.

In this image taken off television by BBC Newsnight, Omar -- fourth from left -- attends a rally with Taliban troops before their victorious assault on Afghanistan's capital, Kabul, in 1996. The Taliban's aim is to impose its interpretation of Islamic law on Afghanistan and remove foreign influence from the country. Most of its members are Pashtun, the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan.

Tanks manned by Taliban fighters are decorated with flowers in front of the presidential palace in Kabul on September 27, 1996.

Taliban soldiers in Russian-made tanks fire on the forces of former Afghan defense minister Ahmad Shah Massood in October 1996.

Afghan women in Kabul are covered head to toe in traditional burqas on October 16, 1996. After taking over Kabul, the ruling Taliban imposed strict Islamic laws on the Afghan people. Television, music and non-Islamic holidays were banned. Women were not allowed to attend school or work outside the home, and they were forbidden to travel alone.

Three women hitch a ride on the back of a donkey cart as they pass by the ruins of Kabul's former commercial district in November 1996.

This is an undated image believed to show the Taliban's former leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar. In 1997, the Taliban issued an edict renaming Afghanistan the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The country was only officially recognized by three countries: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

In 1997, Omar forged a relationship with al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, pictured. Bin Laden then moved his base of operations to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

In March 2001, Taliban soldiers stand at the base of the mountain alcove where a Buddha statue once stood 170 feet high in Bamiyan, Afghanistan. The Taliban destroyed two 1,500-year-old Buddha figures in the town, saying they were idols that violated Islam.

After the 9/11 attacks, the United States conducted military strikes against al Qaeda training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime. In this long-exposure photo, a U.S. Navy fighter jet takes off from the deck of the USS Enterprise on October 7, 2001.

An Afghan anti-Taliban fighter pops up from his tank to spot a U.S. warplane bombing al Qaeda fighters in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan on December 10, 2001. After massive U.S. bombardment as a part of Operation Enduring Freedom, the Taliban lost Afghanistan to U.S. and Northern Alliance forces.

Afghans look into Omar's bedroom as they go through his compound on the outskirts of Kandahar on December 11, 2001.

In April 2011, hundreds of prisoners escaped from a prison in Kandahar by crawling through a tunnel. The Taliban took responsibility for the escape. This picture shows a general view of the prison, top center, and the house, bottom right, from which Taliban militiamen dug the tunnel leading to the prison.

Security guards stand outside the new Taliban political office in Doha, Qatar, before its official opening in June 2013. The Taliban announced that they hoped to improve relations with other countries, head toward a peaceful solution to the Afghanistan occupation and establish an independent Islamic system in the country.

Zafar Hashemi, deputy spokesman for Afghan President Ashraf Ghani, speaks during a news conference on July 29, when the news of Omar's death was announced.

Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour became the leader of the Taliban after Omar's death. Mansour was killed in an airstrike in Pakistan on Saturday, May 21, 2016.

The Taliban

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And yet, pursuing reconciliation is the only option, short of a complete US military withdrawal from Afghanistan – a drastic move that would fulfill one of the Taliban’s preconditions for peace talks, but could also lead to spectacular Taliban battlefield gains and increase the possibility that international terrorists would once again use Afghanistan as a base to plan attacks. This is why withdrawal is likely a non-starter for Washington. Reconciliation must be Plan A, B, and C.

Big battlefield triumphs against the Taliban, despite what the White House suggests, aren’t prerequisites for launching a reconciliation process. What’s needed instead is a patient, sustained diplomatic strategy that addresses key questions: What will it take to get the Taliban talking to Kabul? What type of concessions would Kabul be willing to make? Should Washington negotiate directly with the Taliban? Who else should be involved?

Afghan warlord and ex-prime minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar addresses a special ceremony at The Presidential Palace in Kabul on May 4, 2017.

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Unfortunately, such a strategy is best led by a State Department sidelined by an administration seemingly bent on outsourcing Afghanistan policy to the military (the White House reportedly wants the Pentagon to make final troop number decisions). The risk of a securitized Afghanistan policy is that military strategy will dominate policy discussions and leave critical considerations about reconciliation in the lurch.

President Trump says he wants to start winning again in Afghanistan. However, he’s better off thinking about negotiating than winning. As a businessman who relishes the art of the deal, that shouldn’t be a hard sell. Accordingly, the president should ensure that his Afghanistan policy includes a reconciliation strategy, overseen by diplomats, that maps out a political plan for how Kabul – with US assistance – can pursue a deal with the Taliban.

Reconciliation won’t come easily or quickly, but it’s still worth pursuing. Recall how Colombia, after decades of insurgency and a difficult negotiation process, finally reached a deal last year (albeit a fragile one) to end its long-running conflict.

The Colombia model offers inspiration for Afghanistan – and a more hopeful analogy than Vietnam.